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Abstract The biasing influence of anchors on numerical 
estimates is well established, but the relationship 
between knowledge level and the susceptibility to anchoring 
effects is less clear. In two studies, we addressed the potential 
mitigating effects of having knowledge in a domain on 
vulnerability to anchoring effects in that domain. Of 
critical interest was a distinction between two forms of 
knowledge—metric and mapping knowledge. In Study 1, 
participants who had studied question-relevant 
information—that is, high-knowledge participants—were 
less influenced by anchors than were participants who had 
studied irrelevant information. The results from knowledge 
measures suggested that the reduction in anchoring was tied 
to increases in metric rather than mapping knowledge. In 
Study 2, participants studied information specifically 
designed to influence different types of knowledge. As we 
predicted, increases in metric knowledge—and not mapping 
knowledge—led to reduced anchoring effects. Implications 
for debiasing anchoring effects are discussed. 
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What is the minimum amount of money I am willing to 
accept for my car? 
Have I consumed more than 2,000 calories today? 
How long will it take to drive from Chicago to 
Minneapolis? 
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The questions above exemplify the regularity with which 
people make numeric estimates. A large body of research has 
demonstrated that, although people are sometimes fairly 
accurate when making numeric estimates, these estimates 
are influenced by a variety of factors, including a person’s 
domain- specific knowledge, mood, motivation, the 
availability of new information, and the application of 
heuristics (e.g., Brown & Siegler, 1993; Englich & Soder, 
2009; LaVoie, Bourne, & Healy, 2002; Simmons, LeBoeuf, 
& Nelson, 2010). A particularly robust and well-known bias 
that is relevant to numeric estimation is the anchoring effect. 
In an initial demonstration, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
had participants judge whether the percentage of African 
countries in the United Nations was higher or lower than a 
supposedly random number—that is, an anchor. 
Participants then estimated the percentage of African 
countries in the UN. When the anchor value was 65 %, 
participants gave higher estimates than when the anchor value 
was 10 %. Similar anchoring effects have been found in a 
wide variety of situations, including ratings of university 
professors (Thorsteinson, Breier, Atwell, Hamilton, & 
Privette, 2008), salary negotiations (Thorsteinson, 2011), 
and medical judgments (Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, & 
Bergus, 2007). 
An important point for the present article is that the biasing 
influence of anchors is not something that plagues only nov- 
ices or nonexperts. A number of studies have shown that peo- 
ple with high and low levels of knowledge are both influenced 
by anchors (e.g., Brewer et al., 2007; Englich, 2008; Englich, 
Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). For 
example, legal experts and nonexperts exhibited similar an- 
choring effects when making decisions about hypothetical 
cases (Englich et al., 2006). Likewise, experienced real- 
estate agents’ and undergraduate students’ estimates of home 
prices were equally influenced by comparisons with anchor 
values (Northcraft & Neale, 1987). 
However, the full relationship between anchoring and 
knowledge level is not entirely clear. Alongside studies 
 
 
  
 
 
 
suggesting that knowledge level does not moderate anchoring 
effects are others suggesting that high-knowledge people are 
less influenced by anchors than are their low-knowledge 
counterparts (e.g., Mussweiler & Englich, 2003; Mussweiler 
& Strack, 2000; Smith, Windschitl, & Bruchmann, 2013; Wil- 
son, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). For example, having 
more experience with the cost of items in a particular currency 
led to a decrease in anchoring effects (Mussweiler & Englich, 
2003). Similarly, Smith et al. measured anchoring effects 
across many domains within the same study and found that 
the effects tended to be greatest in domains in which people 
had the least knowledge. 
A general goal motivating the present work was to better 
understand the influence of knowledge on susceptibility to 
anchoring effects. A key supposition guiding the work was 
that in order to generate an adequate understanding of whether 
and when knowledge moderates or protects people from 
anchoring effects, we must factor in a distinction between 
two types of knowledge—metric knowledge and 
mapping knowledge (Brown & Siegler, 1993). 
 
 
 
Metric versus mapping knowledge in a framework 
for quantitative estimation 
 
Imagine that Jonah is estimating the population of Germany. 
Jonah’s estimate will be influenced by a variety of factors, 
including his knowledge, contextual influences (e.g., anchors, 
motivation), and his use of heuristics (e.g., the familiarity with 
the target). Brown and Siegler (1993; see also Brown, 2002; 
von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008) developed a framework of 
quantitative estimation for addressing how people might go 
about making quantitative estimates. An integral feature of 
Brown and Siegler’s framework is the distinction made be- 
tween two types of knowledge that one might have about a 
target. Mapping knowledge refers to how items compare with 
one another (e.g., Germany is larger than Norway, but smaller 
than the US). Metric knowledge refers to the general statistical 
properties (e.g., mean, range) that items tend to have (e.g., 
with a few exceptions, country populations tend to be more 
than 1 million and less than 500 million). 
Continuing with the example of Jonah, one way he might 
go about making his estimate is first to think about how Ger- 
many compares to most other countries. Is Germany a small, 
medium, or large country? Then, Jonah might think about the 
general range of country populations. Is Germany in the range 
of 1–20 million, 20–100 million, or 100–500 million? Using 
Brown and Siegler’s (1993) terminology, Jonah’s estimate 
will reflect both his mapping and metric knowledge. In order 
for Jonah to make an accurate estimate, he would need to be 
knowledgeable about how Germany relates to other countries 
and the general populations of countries. If either property is 
unknown or biased in some way, Jonah’s estimate will likely 
not be accurate. 
 
How mapping versus metric knowledge might matter 
for anchoring research 
 
With regard to the impact of knowledge on anchoring effects, 
the distinction between metric and mapping knowledge seems 
critical. In fact, our main expectation in setting up our studies 
was that only metric and not mapping knowledge mitigates 
the impact of anchors on estimates, since having accurate 
metric knowledge would help people know whether an anchor 
is too high or too low. For example, if a person knows that the 
populations of large European countries tend to be between 20 
and 140 million, he or she would know to give an estimate 
lower than an anchor value of 250 million. Without that 
knowledge, the person might adjust in the wrong 
direction relative to the anchor, leading to increased 
anchoring effects (see Simmons et al., 2010, for a 
demonstration of reduced anchoring effects when the 
direction of adjustment is known). Furthermore, 
beyond simply knowing whether to give  an  estimate  
above  or  below an anchor, a person with high metric 
knowledge would have a better grasp of the 
distribution of values within the range. The person in 
our example might also know that the vast majority of 
European countries have populations well below 70 
million. Therefore, this person would know not only that 
an  anchor  is  too  high,  but also that an accurate answer 
is likely to be less than 70 million. This would lead to 
an estimate farther  away from the anchor (i.e., a 
smaller anchoring effect). 
In contrast to our description of how metric knowledge 
might plausibly mitigate anchoring effects, a similar case for 
pure mapping knowledge is hard to envision. Imagine a per- 
son with no metric knowledge but good mapping knowledge 
about European countries. The fact that this person might 
know that Germany is larger than France but smaller than 
Russia gives him or her little insight into the actual population 
of Germany—leaving that person open to being heavily influ- 
enced by comparisons with anchors. In short, there is a good 
rationale for expecting that metric knowledge, but not map- 
ping knowledge, buffers people against anchoring effects. 
However, a viable alternative to this position is that even 
mapping knowledge buffers people against anchoring effects. 
It may be that either metric or mapping knowledge could 
supply people with confidence or a self-perceived rationale 
about rejecting the provided anchor and adjusting far away 
from it. Imagine a person with low mapping knowledge and 
just enough metric knowledge to know that a provided anchor 
is too high. Without mapping knowledge, this person might 
not have much of a self-perceived rationale for adjusting far 
away from the anchor, and would then settle on an estimate 
close to the anchor (producing large anchoring effects). 
 
 
 
 
 
Another person with high rather than low mapping knowledge 
might have a sense of confidence about rejecting the provided 
anchor and adjusting far away from it. Furthermore, the map- 
ping knowledge might provide a specific rationale for 
extended adjustment. Namely, when the person’s mapping 
knowledge indicates that an estimate should be relatively 
small, the person would be inclined to make large 
adjustments from a high anchor (conducive to smaller 
anchoring effects). For ex- ample, if this person has the 
mapping knowledge that Estonia is smaller than most other 
European countries, this person might make a larger 
adjustment from an obviously high anchor than if he or she 
had no knowledge of Estonia’s relative standing. 
 
Previous anchoring findings vis-à-vis the metric/mapping 
distinction 
 
Previous investigations into the relationship between 
knowledge and anchoring effects have not made a 
distinction be- tween these two types of knowledge; 
researchers have often measured knowledge by asking a 
single knowledge question (e.g., Critcher & Gilovich, 2007; 
Wilson et al., 1996). It is likely that some people rated 
themselves as having high knowledge because they were 
knowledgeable about metric information, whereas others 
rated themselves as having high knowledge because they 
were knowledgeable about mapping information. Studies 
that compare experts to non-experts have assumed that 
experts are more knowledgeable than nonexperts but have 
never assessed whether the experts had higher metric or 
mapping knowledge than the non-experts (e.g., Englich 
et al., 2006). 
Among the small set of anchoring studies that have 
manipulated knowledge (e.g.,  Englich,  2008;  Smith 
et al., 2013),  two  have  used  manipulations  that  could 
be viewed as being specific to metric knowledge. First, 
Mussweiler and Strack (2000) demonstrated that partic- 
ipants who were led to believe that BXiang Long^ was 
a person exhibited smaller anchoring effects than did 
participants who did not know what category (e.g., per- 
son, cultural possession, or location) BXiang Long^ 
belonged to. Second, Simmons et al. (2010) 
manipulated whether or not participants knew whether 
an anchor 
was too high or too low. Participants who knew the 
correct direction to adjust exhibited smaller anchoring 
effects than did those who were not provided this 
information. In both of these studies, it could be argued 
that the participants who exhibited smaller anchoring 
effects were those who had better metric knowledge. In  
the study by Mussweiler and Strack (2000), those who 
knew that BXiang Long^ was a person had some metric 
knowledge, whereas those who did not know the cate- 
gory of BXiang Long^ had no metric knowledge about 
the  target.  Similarly,  the  participants  in  the  study  by 
Simmons et al. (2010) who were told whether the 
anchor was too high or too low had better metric 
knowledge than those who were not given this  
information. Both of these studies provided support for 
our contention that increased metric knowledge leads to 
decreased anchoring effects. However, we assume that 
metric knowledge will provide more of a benefit than 
simply knowing which way to adjust from the anchor, 
although this alone can decrease anchoring effects. 
Furthermore, neither of these studies measured or 
manipulated map- ping knowledge. Therefore, it 
remains unclear whether mapping knowledge, perhaps 
in combination with metric knowledge, can help to 
mitigate anchoring effects. 
Although it is possible that mapping knowledge can help 
decrease the impact of anchors, there is empirical evidence to 
the contrary. Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) had busi- 
ness school students indicate the maximum amount of money 
they would pay for numerous items, with the knowledge that 
they might have to pay that amount for the items. Before 
providing their willingness to pay (WTP), the students com- 
pared their WTP to the last two digits of their social security 
number. Consistent with other anchoring research, the stu- 
dents’ WTP assimilated toward the last two digits of their 
social security numbers (but see Fudenberg, Levine, & 
Maniadis, 2012, for similar studies that failed to produce an- 
choring effects). The students’ estimates, though biased, were 
also ordered sensibly. For example, students generally report- 
ed being willing to pay more for a keyboard than for a mouse, 
regardless of their social security number (a similar pattern 
was found for rare vs. average bottles of wine). Presumably, 
the students had a good idea that a keyboard costs more than a 
mouse (i.e., they had good mapping knowledge), but they still 
showed robust anchoring effects because they did not know 
how much computer accessories tend to cost (i.e., they had 
poor metric knowledge). The research by Ariely et al. suggests 
that having good mapping knowledge does not mitigate 
anchoring effects. However, their study did not explicitly 
test this idea, nor did it investigate whether increased 
metric knowledge might help people overcome the biasing 
influence of anchors. 
 
Present studies 
 
We conducted two studies on the influences of metric and 
mapping knowledge on susceptibility to anchoring effects. 
In Study 1, the two types of knowledge were comanipulated 
in a learning phase, but our use of old and new test items in a 
subsequent anchoring task allowed for conclusions about the 
importance of metric versus mapping knowledge for 
mitigating anchoring effects. In Study 2, we discretely 
manipulated the two types of knowledge. We expected that 
metric knowledge, rather than mapping knowledge, would 
prove critical for mitigating anchoring effects in both studies. 
 
 
 
Study 1 
 
Because our studies involved a manipulation of knowledge, 
we chose a domain for which our participants started with 
relatively limited knowledge—the populations of African 
countries. The procedures of Study 1 were borrowed from 
research on seeding the knowledge base (e.g., Brown & 
Siegler, 1993, 1996, 2001; Friedman & Brown, 2000; LaVoie 
et al., 2002). There were a learning phase and testing phase. 
During the learning phase, participants in what we will call the 
full-knowledge condition acquired metric and mapping 
knowledge about the populations of African countries. 
Participants in a no-knowledge condition acquired neither 
metric nor mapping knowledge; they instead learned the 
capital cities of African countries. 
During the test phase, participants made estimates about 
the populations of African countries after considering high 
or low anchors. Critically, participants made estimates about 
countries from the learning phase (old countries^) and 
countries not from the learning phase (new countries^). A 
some- what obvious prediction is that, for estimates 
regarding the populations of Bold^ countries, the full-
knowledge participants would exhibit smaller anchoring 
effects than the no knowledge participants. More important 
was the prediction that the same pattern would hold for 
new countries. That is, learning the population of some 
countries would make participants less susceptible to 
anchoring effects when making 
estimates about other countries that they had not seen before. 
Our prediction was based on the assumption that viewing 
populations in the learning phase provides a base of metric 
knowledge relevant to other African countries. Therefore, the 
metric knowledge could be helpful in making good esti- 
mates—less biased by anchors—for even the new countries 
that were not in the learning phase. In addition to assessing 
anchoring effects, we also assessed two types of general ac- 
curacy in order to separately measure metric knowledge and 
mapping knowledge. This allowed us to make attributions 
about whether reductions in the anchoring effects for new 
countries (among full-knowledge participants) were due to 
the gain of metric knowledge, mapping knowledge, or both. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design Fifty-two students in an introducto- 
ry psychology course participated as partial fulfillment of a 
research requirement. The study was based on a 2 (Knowl- 
edge Condition: full vs. no knowledge) × 2 (Anchor: high vs. 
low) × 2 (Country List: old vs. new) mixed design. Anchor 
and Country List were within-subjects factors. 
 
Materials In the test phase, participants made estimates for 
one of two lists of 12 countries (Lists A and B). These lists 
were created such that the means and distributions of the 
country populations were roughly equal to one another. 
 
Procedure The participants were told that the experiment had 
two phases. In the first phase, they reviewed information 
about numerous countries and were informed that this 
information would be useful in the second phase of the study. 
During the learning phase, the participants in both the full- 
and no-knowledge conditions learned information about 12 
countries. Approximately half of the participants saw List A 
during the learning phase, and the other half saw List B. This 
counterbalanced factor (i.e., seeing List A or List B in the 
learning phase) did not significantly influence the results. 
Participants in the full-knowledge condition were shown the 
list of 12 countries and their populations. The list was 
displayed in a descending order, to emphasize how the 
countries compared to one another. Participants were, 
therefore, able to clearly ascertain metric and mapping 
knowledge from the list. The participants in the no-
knowledge condition were shown the list of 12 countries 
and their capital cities (these pairs were displayed in a 
random order). The participants in both conditions had 2 min 
to study the information. 
Immediately after the learning phase, all participants indi- 
cated how knowledgeable they were about country popula- 
tions and capital cities using 7-point scales (1 = not at all 
knowledgeable,  7  = extremely knowledgeable). The partici- 
pants were asked to take what they had learned during the 
study into account when answering the knowledge questions. 
In the testing phase of the study, the participants answered 
12 anchoring questions about the populations of 12 countries. 
They made estimates about six countries following a high 
anchor and six countries following a low anchor. The partic- 
ipants read that they would answer questions about the popu- 
lations of African countries—some of which they had previ- 
ously seen and some of which were new—and that they would 
compare the populations to a Brandomly determined^ and 
Bcompletely arbitrary^ value. The anchor values were de- 
scribed as random and arbitrary in order to reduce the possi- 
bility that the anchors would be viewed as informative 
(Schwarz, 1994). 
For each anchoring question, the participants were first 
asked whether the population was more or less than the anchor 
(e.g., BIs the population of Somalia more or less than 2 million 
people?^). The anchor values used were 2 million (low an- 
chor) and 150 million (high anchor). Next, the participants 
estimated the population of the country (e.g., BWhat is the 
population of Somalia?^). The order in which the anchors 
were displayed (i.e., six high and then six low, or six low 
and then six high) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Half of the countries that were asked about in this phase were 
countries that the participants had seen in the learning phase 
(e.g., countries from List A if that was the list that participants 
had seen during the learning phase), and the other half were 
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new countries (e.g., countries from List B if they had seen List = 18.11, p < .001, η 2 = .27, which did not interact with the 
A during the learning phase). The order of presentation of new knowledge condition, F(1, 49) = 1.34, p = .25, η 2 = .03.2 The 
and old countries was randomized for each participant. In total, critical finding was a predicted Knowledge Condition × An- 
2 
the participants saw three old and three new countries with chor interaction, F(1, 49) = 55.11, p < .001, ηp = .53. As is 
high anchors, and three old and three new with low anchors. 
 
Results 
shown in Fig. 1, participants in the full-knowledge condition 
were less influenced by the anchors than were participants in 
the no-knowledge condition. There was no three-way interac- 
2 
tion, F(1, 49) = 1.35, p = .25, ηp = .09, indicating that the 
Anchoring effects 
 
One participant was dropped from the analyses because his or 
her estimates indicated that he or she was not attempting to 
give accurate answers. The primary analysis concerned how 
reduction in bias was not limited to country populations that 
were studied in the learning phase. We further tested this by 
conducting separate 2 (Knowledge) × 2 (Anchor) ANOVAs 
on the SOME values for the old- and new-country estimates. 
The Knowledge × Anchor interaction was significant for both 
2 
the participants’ estimates were influenced by comparisons 
with the anchors (see Appendix A for the median estimates 
the old countries, F(1, 50) = 36.82, p < .001, ηp 
new countries, F(1, 50) = 28.51, p < .001, η 2 
= .42, and the 
= .36. In other 
of each country). To investigate the anchoring effects, we 
calculated the signed order of magnitude error (SOME) for 
each estimate.
1 
The SOME is defined as 
SOME ¼ log10
(  
estimated Value
.
Actual Value
\
: 
 
 
The SOME provides a measure of error that is presented in 
terms of the order of magnitude of the error (Nickerson, 1980). 
For example, if the actual value is 10, estimates of 1, 5, 10, 20, 
and 100 would result in SOME values of –1.0, –0.3, 0, 0.3, 
and 1.0, respectively. A negative SOME value indicates un- 
derestimation, whereas a positive SOME value indicates over- 
estimation. The SOME measure is useful because it minimizes 
the effect of outliers—a common problem when studying do- 
mains that participants are unfamiliar with (Brown, 2002). 
With regard to anchoring effects, we expected that the SOME 
values from estimates following low anchors would be smaller 
than the SOME values from estimates following high anchors. 
From the individual SOME values, we computed four 
words, as expected, full-knowledge participants showed 
smaller anchoring effects for both the old and new countries. 
It would appear that the full-knowledge participants were able 
to generalize the knowledge about the old countries to the new 
countries, and that allowed them to limit the biasing influence 
of the anchors. 
A possible explanation for the reduced anchoring effects in 
the full-knowledge condition is that the knowledge manipula- 
tion simply informed the participants whether the anchor 
values were too high or too low. To investigate whether this 
accounted for the reduction in anchoring effects, we conduct- 
ed a follow-up analysis only on those estimates that were 
lower than the high anchor (when that was the anchor that 
the participant saw) and higher than the low anchor (when 
that was the anchor that they saw). A 2 (Knowledge) × 2 
(Country List) × 2 (Anchor) ANOVA on the remaining 
81.86 % of the estimates again revealed a main effect of an- 
chor, F(1, 45) = 82.62, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .65, the predicted 
Knowledge × Anchor interaction, F(1, 45) = 31.55, p < 
2 
SOME averages for each participant—one for the three re- .001, ηp = .41, and no three-way interaction (F < 1). Separate 
sponses to the old countries following a low anchor, one for 
the three old countries following a high anchor, one for the 
three new countries following a low anchor, and one for the 
2 (Knowledge) × 2 (Anchor) ANOVAs on the old- and new- 
country estimates revealed the predicted Knowledge × An- 
chor interaction for both the old, F(1, 49) = 26.07, p < .001, 
three new countries following a high anchor. These average 2 = .35, and the new, F(1, 45) = 18.86, p < .001, η 2 = .30, 
SOME values were then analyzed in a 2 (Knowledge Condi- 
tion) × 2 (Country List: old or new countries) × 2 (Anchor) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). We found a significant an- 
2 
countries. These analyses revealed that even when focusing 
only on those estimates for which participants adjusted in the 
correct direction, the full-knowledge participants were less 
choring main effect, F(1, 49) = 160.64, p < .001, ηp = .76; biased by the anchors than were the no-knowledge partici- 
participants gave higher estimates following a high anchor 
than following a low anchor. We also found an unexpected 
but relatively unimportant main effect of country list, F(1, 49) 
 
 
1 Analyses conducted on participants’ z-scored estimates 
yielded similar results to analyses on participants’ OME and 
SOME values. We preferred to analyze OME and SOME 
because participants’ estimates were positively skewed, and 
the transformations reduced the influence of outliers (Brown, 
2002). 
pants. Therefore, the impact of the knowledge gained by the 
 
 
2 This main effect reflects that participants gave higher esti- 
mates to the old countries than to the new ones. The countries 
that were old and new were counterbalanced across 
participants, so this cannot be accounted for by differences 
between the actual country populations. Studying the list of 
countries likely increased their availability, and this caused 
participants to give higher population estimates. See Brown, 
Cui, and Gordon (2002, Study 2) for similar findings. 
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averaged together, as were the six OME values for the new- 
country estimates. This left each participant with two 
measures of metric knowledge, one for the old countries and 
one for the new countries. A 2 (Knowledge) × 2 (Country 
List: old vs. new) ANOVA on participants’ average OME 
values revealed two main effects and an interaction (see 
Fig. 2). The 
2 0  
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.6 
main effect of knowledge, F(1, 49) = 83.56, p < .001, ηp   = 
.63, indicated that participants in the full-knowledge condition 
provided more accurate responses than did participants in the 
no-knowledge condition. There was also a main effect of 
2 
country list, F(1, 49) = 24.23, p < .001, ηp = .33. These two 
-0.8 main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 
2 
-1 49) = 21.49, p < .001, ηp = .31. As is shown in Fig. 2, the 
Old New Old New 
Full Knowledge No Knowledge 
Fig. 1 Signed orders of magnitude of errors for participants’ population 
estimates following comparisons with high and low anchors in Study 1. 
The differences between the high- and low-anchor estimates represent the 
magnitude of anchoring effects. Error bars represent ±1 SE 
 
 
full-knowledge participants extended beyond simply knowing 
which direction to adjust from the anchor. 
difference between participants in the full-knowledge and no- 
knowledge conditions was larger when making estimates 
about countries that were on the list in the learning phase 
(i.e., the old countries) than when making estimates about 
countries they had not seen before (i.e., new countries). 
Simple-effect tests revealed that the participants in the full- 
knowledge condition provided more accurate responses than 
did the no-knowledge participants for both the old countries, 
F(1, 49) = 106.31, p < .001, η 2 = .69, and the new countries, 
2 
F(1, 49) = 26.55, p < .001, ηp = .35. 
Measures of metric and mapping knowledge 
 
Participants in the full-knowledge condition exhibited smaller 
anchoring effects than did the no-knowledge participants, but 
an important question is what type of knowledge they were 
endowed with. To answer this question, we evaluated two 
distinct measures of accuracy, one that primarily gauges met- 
ric knowledge and one that primarily gauges mapping 
knowledge. 
 
Metric knowledge To investigate participants’ metric 
knowledge, we computed the order of magnitude of error 
(OME) for each estimate, such that 
In short, it appears that metric knowledge—as assessed by 
OME; see Brown (2002)—was enhanced by the knowledge 
manipulation and that metric knowledge gained about the old 
countries was useful when making estimates about the new 
countries. Given that anchoring effects followed a similar pat- 
tern (reduced in the full-knowledge condition, even for new 
countries), this bodes well for the idea that metric knowledge 
was important for the reduction in anchoring. 
 
Mapping knowledge Whereas OME/mean-level accuracy is 
a measure of metric knowledge, correlational accuracy is a 
measure of a person’s mapping knowledge (Brown, 2002; 
Brown & Siegler, 1993). To evaluate correlational accuracy, 
( \  we calculated within-subjects rank-order correlations between 
OME ¼  log10    Estimated Value
.
Actual Value    : 
The OME represents error in terms of an order of magni- 
tude of the difference (Nickerson, 1980). Small values repre- 
sent less error (greater accuracy), and large values represent 
more error (less accuracy). For example, if the actual value is 
10, estimates of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 100 would result in OME 
values of 1.0, 0.3, 0, 0.3, and 1.0, respectively. Because the 
OME is the absolute value of error, it does not indicate wheth- 
er the error represents over- or underestimation. For this study, 
OME represents how much a participant’s estimate of a  
country’s population deviated from the correct value. OME 
is generally considered a measure of participants’ metric 
 
 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
 
Full knowledge No knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Old New 
Country List 
knowledge (Brown, 2002). 
After calculating the OME for each estimate, the six OME 
values for estimates made about the old countries were 
Fig. 2 Orders of magnitude of errors for participants’ country population 
estimates in Study 1. Higher values indicate greater error (i.e., less 
accurate estimates). Error bars represent ±1 SE 
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the participants’ estimates and the actual country populations, 
separately for the old and new countries. We then computed 
Fisher transformations for each correlation coefficient. A 2 
(Knowledge) × 2 (Country List) ANOVA on participants’ 
transformed correlations revealed two main effects and an 
interaction (for ease of interpretation, Fig. 3 presents the 
Spearman correlation coefficients rather than the transformed 
values). Participants in the full-knowledge condition showed 
better correlational accuracy than did participants in the no- 
2 
conditions. We also examined the relationship between 
participants’ anchoring effects and the two measures of 
knowledge. For each participant, we first calculated the 
difference between their SOME values after high and after 
low anchors, separate- ly for the old and new countries. 
These values served as a measure of participants’ anchoring 
effects, with higher values indicating larger anchoring 
effects. Next, we conducted two regression analyses 
predicting participants’ anchoring effects for the new and old 
countries from their OME and correlation- 
knowledge condition, F(1, 49) = 11.69, p = .001, ηp = .19, al accuracy measures for the old and new countries. For the 
and estimates made about the old countries were more accu- 
rate than those made about the new countries, F(1, 49) = 
2 
old countries, participants’ OMEs significantly predicted their 
anchoring effects, β = .800, t(48) = 7.87, p < .001. Partici- 
16.54, p < .001, ηp = .25. We also found a significant inter- pants’ correlational accuracy, however, was not a significant 
action, indicating that the difference between the knowledge 
conditions varied depending on whether the participants were 
estimating the populations of old or new countries, F(1, 49) = 
2 
predictor of their anchoring effects, β = –.057, t(48) = –0.56, p 
= .58. Similarly, for the new countries, participants’ OMEs 
predicted their anchoring effects, β = .381, t(48) = 2.67, p = 
9.72, p = .003, ηp = .17. A simple-effect test revealed that, for .01, but correlational accuracy did not, β = –.08, t(48) = –0.56, 
estimates about old countries, full-knowledge participants 
showed better correlational accuracy than did no-knowledge 
2 
p = .58. 
participants, F(1, 49) = 12.61, p = .001, ηp = .21. Critically, Subjective knowledge judgments 
however, the same was not true regarding the new countries, 
F(1, 49) = 1.51, p = .23, ηp
2 
= .03. That is, the mapping 
knowledge gained in the learning phase by the full- 
knowledge participants did not increase their correlational ac- 
curacy when they encountered new countries. This finding is 
consistent with previous research that has shown that metric 
knowledge generalizes from old to new items, but mapping 
knowledge does not (e.g., Brown & Siegler, 1993, 1996; 
LaVoie et al., 2002). The important point for the present pur- 
poses is that because mapping knowledge—unlike metric 
knowledge—did not generalize to new countries, it seems 
unlikely that mapping knowledge played a role in mitigating 
the anchoring effects for the new countries. 
 
Measures of knowledge and anchoring effects 
 
The analyses above revealed how OME, correlational accura- 
cy, and anchoring effects differed across the two knowledge 
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Country List 
Fig. 3 Rank-order correlations between participants’ estimates and the 
actual population values in Study 1. Higher values represent greater 
accuracy. Error bars represent ±1 SE 
 
As one would expect, participants in the full-knowledge con- 
dition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.34) reported higher levels of knowl- 
edge about country populations than did participants in the no- 
knowledge condition (M = 1.55, SD = 0.67), t(49) = 4.67, p < 
.001, d = 1.38. Participants in the full-knowledge condition (M 
= 1.97, SD = 1.45) reported lower levels of knowledge about 
capital cities than did participants in the no-knowledge condi- 
tion (M = 3.18, SD = 1.40), t(49) = 3.01, p = .004, d = 0.85. An 
examination of the relationship between participants’ subjec- 
tive knowledge judgments and their anchoring effects re- 
vealed significant negative correlations for both the old, 
r(49) = –.37, p = .007, and the new, r(49) = –.36, p = .01, 
countries. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 1 clearly demonstrated that anchoring effects are mod- 
erated by knowledge level. Participants who learned a list of 
country populations showed smaller anchoring effects than 
did participants who did not learn the populations. Important- 
ly, the full-knowledge participants demonstrated decreased 
anchoring effects for both countries they had previously been 
exposed to and countries they had not seen. In fact, the sizes of 
the anchoring effects were roughly the same for new and old 
countries. It appears that participants generalized some of the 
information they learned to new countries, and this knowledge 
helped to combat the biasing influence of anchors. Also, anal- 
yses focusing only on those estimates that were above the low 
anchor and below the high anchor still revealed decreased 
anchoring effects for the full-knowledge participants. It ap- 
pears that the benefits of knowledge extended beyond simply 
knowing which direction to adjust from the anchor values. 
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What information generalized and helped combat anchor- 
ing effects? The results from the analyses of OME and corre- 
lational accuracy are crucial for this question: Only accuracy 
as measured by OME, and not as measured by a correlation, 
showed improved performance on new items (when compar- 
ing full- to no-knowledge participants). This suggests that 
metric knowledge, but not mapping knowledge, was what 
generalized and helped combat anchoring effects. 
 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 1 demonstrated that knowledge level moderates anchor- 
ing effects and provides initial evidence that this relationship 
depends on the type of knowledge that one has. However, 
participants in the full-knowledge condition were given both 
metric and mapping knowledge, so Study 1 was not a direct 
test of whether increasing metric knowledge—independent of 
mapping knowledge—will successfully reduce anchoring ef- 
fects. Study 2 provided the direct test. Study 2 was similar to 
Study 1 in terms of topic area and methodology, but the pri- 
mary difference was that, in addition to the full- and no- 
knowledge conditions used in Study 1, we created two more 
knowledge conditions. Participants in a distribution condition 
learned information about the distribution of the populations 
of African countries (providing them with metric knowledge), 
whereas participants in a rank-order condition received infor- 
mation about how the countries compare with one another 
(providing them with mapping knowledge). The critical ques- 
tion in Study 2 was whether the new knowledge conditions 
would show reduced anchoring effects. We expected that the 
condition that provided metric information (the distribution 
condition) would show smaller anchoring effects than would 
the condition that provided mapping information (the rank- 
order condition). 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design A total of 106 students in an intro- 
ductory psychology course participated as partial fulfillment 
of a research requirement. This study was based on a 4 
(Knowledge Condition: full, distribution, rank-order, and no 
knowledge)
3 
× 2 (Anchor: high vs. low) between-subjects 
design. 
 
 
3 This study was originally conducted with an additional 
knowledge condition designed to increase metric knowledge. 
An evaluation of the OME values indicated that this manipu- 
lation failed; the OME in this condition was similar to those of 
the rank-order and no-knowledge conditions. This condition 
also exhibited anchoring effects similar to those in the rank- 
order and no-knowledge conditions. 
Materials and procedures Overall, the materials and proce- 
dures were similar to those used in Study 1, with the differ- 
ences noted below. 
During the learning phase, the participants were shown a 
list of the names of 16 African countries, along with additional 
information that varied as a function of the knowledge condi- 
tion. The full- and no-knowledge conditions were the same as 
in Study 1 (i.e., participants in the full-knowledge condition 
saw the country names and populations, whereas those in the 
no-knowledge condition saw the names and capital cities). 
The participants in the distribution condition were shown 
two lists, one with country names, and the other with the 
country populations. The country names were displayed in a 
random order, so the participants did not know what popula- 
tion value went with what country. The participants were, 
however, able to discern the range and distribution of African 
country populations. This provided them with metric informa- 
tion but not mapping information. The rank-order condition 
was shown the list of 16 countries ordered from most to least 
populated, but with no population values provided. This pro- 
vided the participants with mapping information (i.e., how the 
countries compare with one another), but not metric 
information. 
After the learning phase, participants provided subjective 
judgments of their knowledge about African countries. In ad- 
dition to the question about their general knowledge level that 
was used in Study 1, the participants were asked questions 
designed to assess their mapping and metric knowledge. Spe- 
cifically, they were asked how knowledgeable they were about 
Bhow African countries compare to one another in terms of 
their populations (for example, knowing which countries are 
relatively large and which are relatively small)?^ and Bthe 
specific population values that African countries tend to 
be?^ The participants also indicated their knowledge level of 
the capital cities of African countries. 
During the testing phase, the participants made population 
estimates about six countries. The six countries were Bold,^ in 
the sense that they were from the set of 16 on the study list, but 
it is important to point out that only the full-knowledge par- 
ticipants had learned the specific populations of those coun- 
tries. Depending on the anchor condition, a participant made 
his or her six population estimates after seeing either a low or a 
high anchor. In a change from Study 1, the high anchor was 70 
million and the low anchor was 8 million. In Study 1, the high 
(150 million) and low (2 million) anchors were outside the 
range of populations presented to the full-knowledge partici- 
pants during the learning phase. Because of this, it is possible 
that the only reason that the full-knowledge participants were 
less influenced by the anchors was that they were able to reject 
the anchors as that clearly too high or too low. Our use of the 
less extreme anchors (70/8 million) in Study 2 provided a 
more conservative test of how knowledge level moderates 
anchoring effects. 
 
 
p p 
p 
2 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Anchoring effects 
 
To examine the influence of the different types of knowledge 
on anchoring effects, we again computed participants’ SO- 
As in Study 1, we conducted follow-up analyses on only 
those estimates that were lower than the high anchor (when 
participants were shown the high anchor) and higher than the 
low anchor (when participants were shown the low anchor). A 
2 (Knowledge Condition) × 2 (Anchor) ANOVA on the re- 
maining 72.33 % of estimates again revealed a main effect of 
2 
MEs for each estimate and then averaged these values (see anchor, F(1, 96) = 16.46, p < .001, ηp = .15, and the predicted 
Appendix B for the median estimates of each country). A 4 Knowledge Condition × Anchor interaction, F(3, 96) = 4.75, p 
2 
(Knowledge Condition) × 2 (Anchor) ANOVA on partici- = .004, ηp = .13. Even when focusing only on those estimates 
pants’ SOME values revealed a significant anchoring effect, 
2 
that participants adjusted in the correct direction, the full- 
F(1, 95) = 49.45, p < .001, ηp = .34—participants gave higher knowledge and distribution conditions were less influenced 
estimates after high anchors. This main effect was qualified by 
a significant Knowledge Condition × Anchor interaction, F(3, 
2 
by anchors than were the rank-order and no-knowledge con- 
ditions. It would appear that the knowledge gained by the full- 
95) = 4.27, p = .007, ηp = .12 (see Fig. 4 for an illustration of knowledge and distribution participants extended beyond sim- 
the pattern). To test the prediction that the conditions designed 
to improve metric knowledge (the full-knowledge and 
distribution conditions) would show smaller anchoring effects 
than those not designed to improve metric knowledge (the 
rank- order and no-knowledge conditions), we conducted a 
series of interaction contrasts (Abelson & Prentice, 1997). 
Participants in the full-knowledge and distribution 
conditions were similarly influenced by the anchors, F(1, 98) 
= 0.29, p = .59, η 2 = 
p 
ply knowing which direction to adjust from the anchor. 
 
Measures of metric and mapping knowledge 
 
In order to know what the participants learned that allowed the 
full-knowledge and distribution conditions to give less biased 
estimates than the rank-order and no-knowledge conditions, 
we examined measures of metric and mapping knowledge. 
.003. Participants in the full-knowledge, F(1, 98) = 4.53, p = 
.04, η 2 = .04, and distribution, F(1, 98) = 6.82, p = .01, η 2 = Metric knowledge Mean-level accuracy was again evaluated 
.07, conditions were less influenced by anchors than were 
participants in the rank-order condition. And finally, partici- 
pants in the rank-order and no-knowledge conditions were 
similarly influenced by anchors, F(1, 98) = 0.98, p = .32, η 2 
= .01. In short, the pattern of results supports our primary 
expectation that the anchoring effects would be smaller in 
the conditions designed to enhance metric knowledge (the 
full-knowledge and distribution conditions) than in the 
conditions designed to enhance mapping knowledge or 
irrelevant knowledge (the rank-order and no-knowledge 
conditions). 
by computing an OME value for each of the participants’ 
estimates. As a reminder, the OME represents the amount of 
error in participants’ estimates, such that higher values indi- 
cate less accurate responses. A one-way ANOVA on partici- 
pants’ average OME values revealed that they varied as a 
function of the knowledge condition, F(3, 105) = 17.23, p < 
.001, ηp = .34 (see Fig. 5). Follow-up contrast tests revealed 
that participants in the full-knowledge condition had smaller 
OME values than did participants in the distribution condition, 
t(102) = 2.13, p = .036. Those in the distribution condition in 
turn had smaller OME values than did participants in the rank- 
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Fig. 4 Signed orders of magnitude of errors for participants’ population 
estimates following comparisons with high and low anchors in Study 2. 
The differences between the high- and low-anchor estimates represent the 
magnitude of anchoring effects. Error bars represent ±1 SE 
Knowledge Condition 
Fig. 5 Orders of magnitude of errors for participants’ country population 
estimates in Study 2. Higher values indicate greater error (i.e., less 
accurate estimates). Error bars represent ±1 SE 
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order and no-knowledge conditions (ts > 3.60, ps < .001). 
Participants’ OME values in the rank-order and no- 
knowledge conditions did not differ from one another, t(102) 
= 0.17, p = .87. This reveals that participants’ metric knowl- 
edge (as measured by the OME) was enhanced in the full- 
knowledge and distribution conditions. 
 
Mapping knowledge To gauge mapping knowledge, we 
calculated the rank-order correlation between participants’ 
population estimates for the six countries and the actual 
populations of the countries. Next, Fisher transformations 
were per- formed on each participant’s correlation 
coefficient (for ease of interpretation, Fig. 6 presents the 
Spearman correlations). A one-way ANOVA revealed that 
correlational accuracy varied as a function of the knowledge 
condition, F(3, 102) = 5.10, p 
2 
knowledge (but not their mapping knowledge) was increased 
in the distribution condition; and participants’ mapping 
knowledge (but not their metric knowledge) was increased 
in the rank-order condition. 
 
Measures of knowledge and anchoring effects 
 
To address how the measures of accuracy were related to 
anchoring effects, we conducted a regression analysis 
predicting participants’ SOME averages from their anchor 
condition (low or high), OME, correlational accuracy, and 
the two two-way interaction terms. This analysis revealed 
main effects of participants’ anchor condition, β = .52, 
t(100) = 8.00, p < .001, and OME, β = –.29, t(100) = 3.88, 
p < .001. The two interaction terms also significantly predict- 
= .003, ηp = .13. Follow-up contrast tests revealed that par- ed participants’ SOME values. First, the interaction between
ticipants in the rank-order and full-knowledge conditions did 
not vary in terms of their correlational accuracies, t(102) = 
1.28, p = .20. Participants in the rank-order and full- 
knowledge conditions exhibited greater correlational 
accuracies than the other two conditions (ps < .08). The 
correlational accuracies of participants in the 
distribution and no- knowledge conditions also did not 
differ (p = .44). These analyses reveal that participants’ 
mapping knowledge, as measured by correlational accuracy, 
was enhanced in the rank- order and full-knowledge 
conditions. Mapping knowledge was unaffected—relative to 
the no-knowledge condition—in the distribution condition. 
Taken together, these two measures reveal the expected 
pattern. Participants’ mapping and metric knowledge were 
increased in the full-knowledge condition; participants’ metric 
 
0.8 
anchor condition and participants’ OME was significant, β = 
.34, t(100) = 4.60, p < .001: Participants who had lower OME 
values were less influenced by anchors. Second, we found an 
interaction between anchor condition and participants’ 
correlational accuracy, β = .17, t(100) = 2.38, p = .02: As 
correlational accuracy increased, participants’ estimates 
were more influenced by anchors, rather than less 
influenced. The direction of this relationship, which may 
seem surprising, likely reflects the different impacts of the 
information studied in the distribution and rank-order 
conditions. The information in the distribution condition 
kept the anchoring effects small and left people without 
much correlational accuracy. The in- formation in the rank-
order condition allowed for high anchoring effects and good 
correlation accuracy. Taken together, the two interactions 
reported above clearly indicate that greater metric 
knowledge—and not greater mapping knowledge—is 
associated with smaller anchoring effects. 
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Subjective knowledge judgments 
 
Recall that the participants made self-assessments about their 
general knowledge, mapping knowledge, metric knowledge, 
and capital-city knowledge. Responses for the first three were 
correlated (rs ranged from .37 to .59, ps < .001). Separate one- 
way ANOVAs per question revealed sensible patterns (see 
Fig. 7). Here we briefly report the key comparisons. For the 
general-knowledge question, ANOVA contrasts revealed 
higher self-assessments in the full-knowledge than in the 
distribution and no-knowledge conditions (ps < .05), and 
mar- 
Fig. 6 Rank-order correlations between participants’ estimates and the 
actual population values in Study 2. Higher values represent greater 
accuracy. Error bars represent ±1 SE 
ginally higher estimates in the rank-order condition than the 
no-knowledge condition (p = .06). For the mapping question, 
self-assessments were higher in the full-knowledge than in the 
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General discussion 
 
These studies reveal that the particular type of knowledge that 
people have is an important determinant of their susceptibility 
to anchoring effects. In Study 1, participants who studied a list 
of country populations—that is, the full-knowledge partici- 
pants—were less influenced by anchors than were participants 
who learned irrelevant information. Importantly, the full- 
knowledge participants showed smaller anchoring effects 
when making estimates about countries they had previously 
studied and about new countries they had not previously seen. 
With the new countries, the full-knowledge participants 
demonstrated increased metric knowledge, but not increased 
map- 
Fig. 7 Means of participants’ subjective knowledge judgments split by 
knowledge condition and knowledge judgment in Study 2. Responses 
were made on a 1 (not at all knowledgeable) t o  7 (extremely 
knowledgeable) scale. Error bars represent ±1 SE 
 
 
rank-order condition (p = .02), and in the rank-order than in 
the distribution and no-knowledge conditions (ps < .01). For 
the metric question, self-assessments in the full-knowledge 
condition were the highest (ps < .05); the assessments in the 
other three conditions did not differ significantly from one 
another (ps > .15). For the capital-cities question, self- 
assessments were highest in the no-knowledge condition (p 
< .001)—a result likely due to the fact that the no-knowledge 
condition were the only ones to study capital cities during the 
learning phase. 
Finally, we examined whether participants’ subjective 
knowledge ratings were related to their anchoring effects. 
We computed a regression analysis using participants’ anchor 
condition (high vs. low), their subjective knowledge 
judgments (general, mapping, and metric), and the three 
interaction terms to predict their average SOME values for 
their six estimates. Again, anchor condition predicted the 
participants’ estimates, β = .57, t(98) = 6.95, p < .001. 
More importantly, the only other significant effect was 
the Metric × Anchor Condition interaction, β = –.19, t(98) 
= 2.05, p = .04: Participants who reported high levels of 
metric knowledge were less influenced by anchors than 
were participants who reported low levels of metric 
knowledge. The Mapping × Anchor Condition (p = .88) and 
General × Anchoring Condition (p = .45) interactions did 
not approach significance. These results are consistent with 
the larger pattern of results from objective knowledge 
measures and suggest that self-assessments targeted 
toward metric knowledge rather than mapping or general 
knowledge will be most successful in predicting 
susceptibility to anchoring effects. 
ping knowledge—implicating metric knowledge as an 
important determinant of susceptibility to anchoring effects. 
Study 2 more directly tested the importance of metric 
knowledge in reducing anchoring effects. Participants learned 
information specifically designed to influence their metric or 
mapping knowledge (or both). As predicted, participants in 
conditions that increased metric knowledge exhibited reduced 
anchoring effects. Those in the condition that only increased 
mapping knowledge showed anchoring effects similar to 
those in the no-knowledge condition. 
In both studies, the benefits of increased metric knowledge 
extended beyond simply knowing whether the anchors were 
too high or too low. When focusing our analyses only on those 
participants who adjusted in the correct direction from high 
and low anchors, higher metric knowledge was associated 
with smaller anchoring effects. In addition to knowing in 
which direction to adjust, people with high metric knowledge 
also had a better sense of the distribution of African countries. 
Therefore, they were better able to overcome the biasing 
influence of anchors. 
 
Practical implications for debiasing anchoring effects 
 
Anchoring effects have been observed in numerous real-world 
settings, including legal experts’ sentencing decisions 
(Englich et al., 2006), doctors’ diagnoses (Brewer et al., 
2007), and personal-injury damages awards (Chapman & 
Bornstein, 1996). Therefore, finding ways of reducing 
anchoring effects could have numerous practical 
implications. Un- fortunately, anchoring effects tend to be 
quite resistant to debiasing manipulations such as 
forewarning people about their biasing influence (e.g., 
Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Wilson et al., 1996). Our studies, 
however, demonstrated that manipulations of metric 
knowledge can reduce participants’ anchoring effects. 
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A situation in which anchoring effects are potentially costly 
is in personal-injury damages awards. In general, the more 
money a plaintiff requests as compensation for their pain 
and suffering, the more money they are awarded by jurors 
(Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Hinsz & Indahl, 1995; Malouff 
& Schutte, 1989; Marti & Wissler, 2000). This occurs even 
when controlling for the severity of the injury, resulting in 
high variability in awards for similar cases (Saks, Hollinger, 
Wissler, Evans, & Hart, 1997). Our studies suggest that a 
simple and effective intervention to reduce anchoring effects 
would be to give jurors brief descriptions of several cases, 
including the amount of money awarded to the plaintiff in 
each case (analogous to the full-knowledge conditions in our 
studies; see Saks et al., 1997, for a similar study). In fact, this 
intervention could perhaps be simplified by only giving jurors 
the amount of money awarded to each plaintiff, without any 
description of the details of the case (similar to the distribution 
condition in our Study 2). Presumably, this would be enough 
to increase the jurors’ metric knowledge about usual award 
amounts. They should, therefore, be less influenced by the 
amount of money requested by the plaintiff. Ideally, this 
would increase the correspondence between the severity of 
the injury and the amount awarded. 
 
Final thoughts 
 
Although it might seem reasonable to assume that more 
knowledgeable people should be less biased, the present 
studies illustrate that this is not always the case. The 
relationship between knowledge and anchoring effects is 
complex, be- cause not all types of knowledge are equally 
effective at reducing the biasing influence of anchors. 
Knowing this, re- searchers can now make better 
predictions about the moderating role of knowledge in 
anchoring studies. Additionally, these findings can guide 
practitioners in developing debiasing techniques that may 
effectively reduce the biasing influence of anchors. In 
conclusion, increased knowledge is important, but only the 
right type of knowledge can reduce bias. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
 
Table 1 Median estimates and anchoring indexes in Study 1 for each country, split by anchor and knowledge conditions 
African Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The anchoring effect was calculated by dividing the difference between the median estimate following a high anchor and the median estimate following a 
low anchor by the difference between the high and low anchors (see Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995) 
 Ethiopia Kenya Mozam- 
bique 
Niger Somalia Togo Egypt Algeria Cameroon Mali Guinea Libya 
No knowledge High anchor 187.50 87.50 16.50 100.00 95.00 85.00 200.00 68.00 45.00 80.00 15.00 105.00 
estimate             
Low anchor 2.25 50.00 1.25 2.75 7.00 1.00 4.00 12.50 4.00 1.00 5.00 1.80 
estimate             
Anchoring 1.25 0.25 0.10 0.66 0.59 0.57 1.32 0.38 0.28 0.53 0.07 0.70 
effect             
Full knowledge   High anchor 38.00 35.00 20.00 15.00 26.50 6.00 80.00 25.50 19.00 14.00 12.00 9.00 
estimate             
Low anchor 34.00 15.00 10.00 14.50 8.00 6.00 57.50 20.00 10.00 11.00 6.00 8.00 
estimate             
Anchoring 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 
effect             
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
 
Table 2 Median estimates and anchoring indexes in Study 2 for each country, split by anchor and knowledge conditions 
 
 
African Countries 
 
 Sudan Kenya Ghana Cameroon Zambia Senegal 
Full knowledge High-anchor estimate 65.00 55.00 30.00 20.00 24.00 15.00 
 Low-anchor estimate 39.00 32.50 21.50 16.50 13.00 10.50 
 Anchoring effect 0.42 0.36 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.07 
Distribution High-anchor estimate 28.00 35.00 35.00 28.00 6.00 15.00 
 Low-anchor estimate 13.00 20.00 22.00 23.00 10.00 12.00 
 Anchoring effect 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.08 –0.06 0.05 
Rank order High-anchor estimate 50.00 60.00 40.00 30.00 24.00 15.00 
 Low-anchor estimate 10.00 9.50 8.00 6.50 6.00 5.00 
 Anchoring effect 0.65 0.81 0.52 0.38 0.29 0.16 
No knowledge High-anchor estimate 60.00 50.00 35.00 15.00 53.00 20.00 
 Low-anchor estimate 7.00 10.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.50 
 Anchoring effect 0.85 0.65 0.45 0.15 0.76 0.22 
The anchoring effect was calculated by dividing the difference between the median estimate following a high anchor and the median estimate following a 
low anchor by the difference between the high and low anchors (see Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995) 
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